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PRITCHARD VERSUS PRITCHARD ON LUCK
JOB DE GREFTE
Abstract: This paper argues for a particular account of luck by comparing two 
distinct versions of the modal account of luck that have been provided by 
Duncan Pritchard (2005, 2014). More specifically, it argues that there are three 
respects in which Pritchard’s earlier modal account of luck is preferable to his 
later account: it accounts better for the fact that luck comes in degrees, it in-
cludes a significance condition, and it better acknowledges the subjective nature 
of luck. The paper then discusses two consequences of the points it makes for 
epistemology: an alleged pragmatic encroachment, and a particular view on the 
relation between knowledge, luck, and justification.
Keywords: epistemic luck, justification, knowledge, luck, modal account, 
Pritchard, pragmatic encroachment.
Luck features prominently in our daily lives, as well as in our 
philosophical theories.1 The modal account of luck is one of the most 
prominent explications of the concept of luck.2 Duncan Pritchard’s 
Epistemic Luck (2005) provides one of the most comprehensive and illu-
minating expositions of this account. In recent writings, however, Pritchard 
modified his views (2014). In this paper, I attempt to accomplish two 
things: first, I identify and review the proposed changes to the modal 
account of luck. Perhaps surprisingly, I argue that Pritchard was wrong to 
change his views: overall, his 2005 time slice has a better account of luck 
than does his 2014 time slice.3 Second, I examine two consequences of the 
points I make in this paper for epistemology specifically.
1 For some examples in epistemology, see Pritchard 2005; de Grefte 2018. For examples 
in ethics, see Levy 2011; Williams and Nagel 1976.
2 That is not to say it is uncontested, of course. See for example Lackey 2008; Hiller and 
Neta 2006; Goldberg 2015.
3 Pritchard’s thought moves quickly; his most recent work focuses not luck but on the 
related notion of risk; see Pritchard 2015; Pritchard 2016; Bondy and Pritchard 2018. In this 
paper, I focus exclusively on the notion of luck.
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1. Three Differences
According to Epistemic Luck (2005), luck is subject to two conditions, 
individually necessary and jointly sufficient for an event to be lucky:
(L1) If an event is lucky, then it is an event that occurs in the actual world 
but which does not occur in a wide class of the nearest possible worlds 
where the relevant initial conditions for that event are the same as in the 
actual world. (128)
(L2) If an event is lucky, then it is an event that is significant to the agent 
concerned (or would be significant, were the agent to be availed of the 
relevant facts). (132)
The core thought behind the modal account of luck is that lucky 
events are events that could easily have failed to occur. This thought is 
supported by considering paradigmatic cases of luck, such as finding 
treasure in one’s yard by randomly digging a hole. If one was digging 
randomly, one could easily have dug at another location, and so one 
could easily have failed to find the treasure. If we modify the case such 
that one was using a metal detector, then one could not easily have failed 
to find the treasure, and we would correspondingly no longer regard the 
event as lucky.
(L2), on the other hand, is meant to express the thought that all lucky 
events have some significance. (L2) is required, according to Pritchard 
2005, because there could be some events that satisfy (L1) but that we 
would not consider to be lucky, such as small avalanches occurring at the 
South Pole, or the wind on Mars creating dunes in the shape of a heart. If 
no sentient being accords any significance to the event, it is not a matter 
of luck, it seems.
In “The Modal Account of Luck” (2014) Pritchard makes it clear that 
he deviates from Pritchard 2005 as far as the role of (L2) is concerned: 
contra Pritchard 2005, here he does not consider (L2) to be necessary 
for luck. I believe, however, that there are in addition at least two other 
respects in which Pritchard 2014 deviates from Pritchard 2005. The first of 
these concerns the various ways in which luck is said to come in degrees, 
the second concerns the question whether luck is a subjective or an objec-
tive notion. Below I defend Pritchard 2005 against Pritchard 2014 with 
respect to each of these three differences.
2. Significance
The first difference between Pritchard’s time slices has, as I said above, 
been mentioned by Pritchard himself: Pritchard 2005 thinks that (L2) 
is necessary for luck, whereas Pritchard 2014 does not think that it is 
necessary.
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Are lucky events always events that are significant to some agent? There 
are (at least) three reasons to believe that they are. The first is based on 
ordinary usage. Normally, we do not say that small avalanches at the South 
Pole are lucky, or that heaps of sand on Mars luckily form certain pat-
terns. When we are uninterested in an event, we call the event “unlikely” 
or “improbable,” but not “lucky.” It is no accident that the Oxford English 
Dictionary defines luck as “the fortuitous happening of an event favour-
able or unfavourable to the interest of a person.” This indicates that sig-
nificance is a central feature of our ordinary usage of the concept of luck.
As for my second reason, we may observe that the same event can at the 
same time be a case of luck for one person but not for another. Suppose 
Jane wins the lottery. Jane is clearly lucky, but the event is not a case of 
luck (good or bad) for John, when John has no interest in either Jane or 
the lottery. Importantly, we are not concerned with Jane and John’s own 
judgements about luck. No doubt, Jane would regard her lottery win as 
lucky, whereas John would not. Even from an objective, disinterested per-
spective, however, the lottery win is lucky for Jane but not for John. This 
suggests that luck is a relation between an event and an agent, rather than 
a property of events. An event is lucky only for someone. A significance 
condition on luck allows us to nicely capture this agent-relativity of luck. 
In the example above, the lottery clearly has high significance for Jane, 
which would explain why we think her case is a case of luck. But it has no 
such significance for John, which would explain why we think the event is 
not a case of luck for him.
My final reason is that we have available a slew of related notions, such 
as “chanciness” and “unlikelihood,” that seem to share the modal profile 
of lucky events but do not require significance. Again, we would call ava-
lanches at the South Pole unlikely or chancy, but not lucky. If, however, we 
modify our example such that the same unlikely avalanche destroyed the 
Amundsen-Scott South Pole Station, this would surely constitute a case 
of bad luck for the relevant research community. A significance condition 
of luck would allow us to explain these divergent usages. Without signif-
icance, the avalanche is merely unlikely; when it acquires significance, it 
becomes a case of (bad) luck.
The way we ordinarily use the concept of luck thus seems to indicate in 
several ways that luck requires significance. To be sure, we can propose to 
revise our pre-theoretical concepts, but there must be a good reason to do 
so. The main reason Pritchard 2014 provides is that “[w]e shouldn’t expect 
an account of the metaphysics of lucky events to be responsive to such 
subjective factors as whether an event is the kind of thing that people care 
about enough to regard as lucky” (604).
I think Pritchard is right to the extent that we don’t need the notion of 
significance to describe the modal profile of lucky events. But what I have 
been arguing here is that if  we want to understand the role the concept 
of luck plays in our ordinary thought and language, these metaphysics of 
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luck alone will not suffice. For that kind of project, Pritchard 2005 is much 
better equipped.
3. Degrees of Luck
The second difference between Pritchard 2005 and Pritchard 2014 con-
cerns the various ways in which luck is said to come in degrees. Of par-
ticular importance is the proportion of nearby worlds where the relevant 
event fails to occur. Here the difference between the earlier and the later 
Pritchard is that Pritchard 2005 states that in order to be lucky, an event 
must fail to occur in a wide class of nearby possible worlds, whereas 
Pritchard 2014 appears to find it sufficient that there are any “close pos-
sible worlds in which the event does not obtain” (599).
So, the crucial question here is: Do a few nearby possible worlds where 
event E fails to occur suffice to make E lucky? Matters are somewhat 
complicated here, but ultimately I believe Pritchard 2005 has the better 
formulation.
At first sight, however, things may appear otherwise. Suppose Jane par-
ticipates in a fair lottery. Without consulting the results, she forms the 
belief  that she lost, purely on the basis of the statistics involved. Her belief 
turns out to be true. Pritchard 2014 submits that Jane’s belief  is luckily 
true: “[T]he subject’s true belief  is just down to luck, since she could so 
very easily have formed a false belief  (i.e., had the balls fallen in a slightly 
different configuration, such that she owned the winning lottery ticket)” 
(597–98).
Here I think Pritchard is right. If  we let our account of luck be informed 
by the master intuition that a lucky event could have easily failed to occur, 
then Jane’s belief  should be counted as luckily true, since in this case Jane’s 
belief  could have easily been false: the nearest world in which it is false is 
almost exactly like the actual world.4
To the contrary, Pritchard 2005 seems to be committed to the claim that 
Jane’s belief  is not a matter of luck, since while it is false in one nearby 
possible world, it is not false in a “wide class” of them.5 In the vast major-
ity of the nearest possible worlds, Jane will be right, and her ticket will be 
a loser. In this respect, Pritchard 2014 is in a better position to make sense 
of our lottery case than Pritchard 2005: Jane’s belief  could have easily 
failed to be true, and thus it needs to be counted as a case of luck if  we are 
to remain faithful to the central thought guiding the modal account of 
4 To be as clear as possible, assume that we are considering the event just one second after 
it occurred, such that it does not yet have any consequence for Jane’s life.
5 To handle lottery cases, Pritchard 2005 (163) proposes a strict safety condition. This 
safety condition, however, does not seem to impact Pritchard’s general analysis of luck.
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luck, that lucky events could have easily failed to occur. But Pritchard’s 
2005 account does not allow this.
At first sight, we might thus think that Pritchard 2014 has the upper 
hand over Pritchard 2005 in this respect. Problems arise for Pritchard 
2014, however, when we consider the various ways in which luck comes in 
degrees. It is evident that luck is a gradual notion: one can be more lucky 
or less lucky. The question before us is how Pritchard’s account under con-
sideration accommodates this feature. Pritchard 2014 explains the graded 
nature of luck solely in terms of the nearness of  nearest possible worlds 
in which the event fails to occur. Thus, “the degree of luck involved varies 
with the modal closeness of the world in which the target event doesn’t 
obtain” (2014, 600). While this principle seems plausible enough—I was 
more lucky to run into an old friend from Australia rather than to run into 
my flat mate today, because more would need to change with respect to the 
actual for the second event to fail to obtain than for the first—it cannot 
be the only factor influencing degree of luck. If  modal nearness were the 
only driver for differences in degree of luck, then Pritchard 2014 could 
not accommodate the following reasonable assumption: the belief  John 
has that he will win the lottery, if  true, is subject to a much higher degree 
of luck than the belief  Jane has that she will lose the lottery, if  that belief 
were also to be true. For the minimal modal distance between the worlds 
where one loses and the actual world where one wins is exactly the same 
as the minimal modal distance between the worlds where one wins and the 
actual world where one loses. In both cases, just one ball would have to fall 
in a different location for the outcome to be radically different. If  degree 
of luck is solely determined by distance to the actual world, the events 
should be subject to the same degree of luck. Note, moreover, that we still 
have the intuition that John’s belief  is luckier than Jane’s belief  if  we add 
that winning and losing would have the same (but inverted) significance 
for John and Jane. Our intuition thus does not trade on the fact that win-
ning a lottery is much more significant, usually, than losing it.
Pritchard 2014 does not comment on this issue, but Pritchard 2005 
seems to be aware of it: “As the width of the worlds in which the event in 
question does not obtain recedes, then our intuition that luck is involved 
recedes with it” (130). This would explain the difference between John and 
Jane: John’s belief  is false in a much higher proportion of nearby possible 
worlds than Jane’s is. What we need is an account of luck that accommo-
dates the relevance of the proportion of nearby possible worlds where the 
event fails to obtain for the overall degree of luck to which it is subject.
It thus seems advisable to include the width of the nearby worlds in 
which the event fails to obtain in our definition of luck, as Pritchard 2005 
does. In our example, the belief  Jane has that she will lose is subject to a 
low, but still significant, degree of luck.6 But it is easier for Prichard 2005 
6 At the very least, the degree of luck is significant enough to prohibit us from ascribing 
knowledge in such lottery cases.
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to accommodate this fact than for Pritchard 2014. Interpreting luck as a 
graded notion would then still allow us to say that Jane’s belief  is some-
what luckily true. While her belief  is not false in many nearby possible 
worlds, it is still false in some of them, and this suffices to make her belief 
a genuine case of luck. For Pritchard 2014 Jane’s belief  is as lucky as 
John’s, even if  we regard luck as a gradual notion.
4. Subjective or Objective Luck?
The third and final difference between Pritchard 2005 and Pritchard 
2014 to be discussed here concerns the fact that the later Pritchard, much 
more than the former, stresses the objective nature of luck: “Our subjec-
tive judgements about luck are not to be taken at face value, but rather 
evaluated relative to an objective standard for lucky events” (2014, 605). 
And we have already seen that when discussing the absence of a sig-
nificance condition in his later account, Pritchard writes that a proper 
account of the metaphysics of lucky events should not be responsive to 
such subjective factors as whether an event is the kind of thing that peo-
ple care about enough to regard as lucky, again seeming to draw a dis-
tinction between his earlier account, which did include some subjective 
factors like significance, and his later account, which does not.
As I have already argued, a complete account of luck does include a 
significance condition, and therefore luck is, at a fundamental level, a sub-
jective phenomenon. The degree to which an event is a case of luck for a 
particular agent partly depends on the significance that agent accords to 
that event. Since various agents will presumably attach varying degrees of 
significance to the same event, this introduces a subjective factor in the 
analysis of luck.
There is another reason, however, why I think we should conceive of 
luck as a subjective phenomenon: namely, even without a significance con-
dition on luck, various agents may provide different descriptions of the 
same event, and these different descriptions will imply different degrees of 
luck. Consider another lottery case. Jones buys a ticket, and he wins the 
lottery. As I have been arguing, cases like these constitute clear cases of 
luck. But note that this requires that we hold certain “relevant initial con-
ditions” fixed. For example, Jones’s win is lucky only provided the lottery 
is fair. If  Jones instead rigged the lottery in his favour, he could no longer 
easily have lost, and so his win would not be a case of luck anymore. This 
means the degree of luck to which an event is subject will depend on how 
we specify the initial conditions for that event.
What are the relevant initial conditions for an event? I believe this is not 
an objective matter. Suppose we take the relevant event to be Jones’s fair 
lottery win. There are still various possible ways of spelling out the rele-
vant initial conditions. For examples, we may take the relevant initial 
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conditions for the event to be the exact microphysical state of the universe 
just before the draw, together with all the laws of physics. Given this set of 
initial conditions, it may well be determined whether Jones wins or not. 
That is, given these conditions, there will be no possibility, near or far, 
where Jones loses. under this description luck will be completely absent 
from his win, even if  he does not rig the lottery. But I take it most of us 
would take a less specific set of conditions into account when assessing 
whether Jones was lucky to win. On such a coarse-grained description of 
initial conditions, there are nearby worlds where these conditions hold but 
the event fails to obtain.7 Which description should we choose then, a 
course-grained description of Jones’s win, which will provide the intuitive 
result that Jones’s win is a case of luck, or a fine-grained description, 
which will mean we have to revise our intuitive judgements regarding the 
luckiness of lottery wins? There seems to be nothing in the modal account 
of luck that allows us to prefer one description of the event over the other 
on principled grounds. I suspect that what the “proper” set of relevant 
initial conditions is for an event will depend on such factors as the impor-
tance of the event in question and the information that we happen to have 
in our possession in each particular instance. The inclusion of a set of 
relevant initial conditions in both of Pritchard’s definitions of luck there-
fore introduces another subjective element in the analysis of luck besides 
significance.
If  my suspicion turns out to be right, and there is no fact of the matter 
about what the relevant initial conditions for an event are, and conse-
quently about whether an event is a case of luck or not, this has remained 
largely unnoticed in the literature on luck.8 This is striking, the more so 
because it closely resembles a well-known problem for objective theories of 
probability. This related problem is known as the “reference class prob-
lem,” and it concerns the fact that the probability of an event depends on 
what we take to be the relevant reference class for that event.9 This would 
not be a problem for objective theories of probability if  there were one 
reference class that is the “correct” one, such that its corresponding prob-
ability would be the “correct” probability for the event. unfortunately, this 
is not the case (Hájek 2007, 565). Interestingly, luck resembles probability 
in this respect. For similarly the degree of luck to which an event is subject 
7 For example, we may restrict the set of initial conditions to just the claim that Jones 
bought a random ticket in a fair lottery. Given this condition only, Jones could easily have 
lost.
8 Nicholas Rescher is a possible exception, when he says: “The idea of good (or bad) luck 
is inherently context relative” (2014, 623). Perhaps this is due to the fact that he considers 
luck in a probabilistic framework.
9 See, for example, Hájek 2007; Reichenbach 1949. Hájek traces the problem back to 
John Venn (1888). A more complete comparison between these problems for luck and prob-
ability is called for. I hope to undertake such a project in the future.
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depends on the specification of its relevant initial conditions, and it does 
not seem to be the case that there is a “correct” set of relevant initial con-
ditions that allows us to pick out an “objective” degree of luck.
In the debate about probability, the reference class problem has led 
many to abandon an objective interpretation of probability. I think a sim-
ilar move is in order in the debate about luck. Pritchard 2014 says that “as 
philosophers our interest is ultimately not in our subjective judgements 
about luck as such . . . but rather in luck as an objective phenomenon” 
(605). If  I am correct, we should rather re-focus our attention on luck as a 
subjective phenomenon.
5. Two Consequences
In the preceding paragraphs, I argued that there are three respects in 
which Pritchard’s earlier modal account of luck seems to have the upper 
hand over Pritchard’s later version of the modal account. That con-
cludes the first part of this paper. In the second part, I review some of 
the consequences of the account of luck emerging from this paper for 
some of the philosophical debates in which luck plays an important 
role. Here I focus my discussion on recent work in epistemology.10
First, as epistemologists have argued for a long time, certain kinds of 
luck are incompatible with the possession of knowledge.11 In particular, 
many people have thought that veritic luck is incompatible with knowl-
edge, where veritic luck can be defined as follows:
Veritic luck: S’s belief  that p is veritically lucky if  and only if  p is true in the 
actual world, but the belief-forming method that generated S’s belief  that p 
produces a false belief  in a nearby possible world.
The idea behind this form of anti-luck epistemology is thus that a 
method that could easily have produced false belief cannot generate 
knowledge. For belief-forming methods to generate knowledge, a certain 
counterfactual robustness is required. These methods cannot too easily 
lead one to believe falsely if they are to produce knowledgeable belief.
In this paper, I have argued that luck is a subjective phenomenon, in 
that the extent to which an event is a case of luck will depend both on the 
significance of that event to the agent concerned and on the specification 
10 That is of course not to say that the account does not have interesting consequences in 
other areas of philosophy, such as ethics, as well.
11 unger 1968 and Engel 1992 provide some of the earliest attempts to specify which 
kinds of luck exactly are (in)compatible with the possession of knowledge. Pritchard 2005 
builds and expands considerably on this work. I have argued elsewhere that the distinction 
between internalism and externalism about epistemic justification can be drawn in terms of 
various forms of epistemic luck (de Grefte 2018).
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that we use for the event. If  veritic luck is incompatible with knowledge, 
then this will mean that knowledge itself  will be something that is partly 
subjective too. Whether we possess knowledge may sometimes depend on 
how significant the truth of our beliefs is to us, and how we care to specify 
the relevant initial conditions for the formation of our true belief, includ-
ing our method of belief  formation.12
It is precisely the former source of subjectivity that Nathan Ballantyne 
(2012, 2014) uses to argue against anti-luck philosophy in general. If, 
Ballantyne argues, degree of luck depends on significance, then we can 
construct cases in which the truth of the belief  is just significant enough 
for the degree of veritic luck to be high enough to prevent knowledge. 
An otherwise similar event to which an agent then attaches only slightly 
less significance would then qualify as knowledge, for the degree of veritic 
luck would be less. Ballantyne deems this form of pragmatic encroach-
ment unreasonable when he writes, “It seems absurd that we could prevent 
a thinker from potentially knowing just by making a true belief  slightly 
more significant for her” (2014, 1398).
Perhaps the modal theory of luck has these consequences. It is not 
clear, however, that they are entirely unwelcome. As Ballantyne is well 
aware, recent work on pragmatic encroachment in epistemology seems to 
have similar consequences (Hawthorne 2004; Fantl and McGrath 2002, 
2007). Ballantyne thinks the problem he identifies for anti-luck epistemol-
ogy is different from “normal” cases of pragmatic encroachment because 
increasing the significance of an event may not just prevent knowledge but 
“Gettierize” one’s belief. This requires the assumption that all cases of ver-
itic luck are Gettier cases. While I do believe this claim’s contrary is true—
that all Gettier cases involve veritic luck—I do not share this assumption. 
For example, forming a true belief  on the basis of simple guessing would 
be a case of veritic luck on my account, since one could easily have formed 
a false belief  in this way, but few of us would call beliefs formed in this 
way justified.
Whether proponents of pragmatic encroachment are right or not, there 
is another line of defence against Ballantyne’s charge that I think is avail-
able to the anti-luck epistemologist. This line is anticipated by Pritchard 
(2005, n. 6.2) and further developed by Lee Whittington (2016). The main 
idea is that when we are assessing epistemic luck, we are in the epistemic 
normative domain, and so what is relevant for veritic luck is whether the 
event has epistemic significance. Since truth clearly seems to have epis-
temic significance—in the sense that it brings us in closer contact with 
12 It is here that the “generality problem” rears its ugly head (Conee and Feldman 1998). 
Without a principled way to specify our belief-forming methods, we will not be able to pro-
vide a principled answer to the question whether, on any occasion, we possess knowledge. 
Kelly Becker (2008) argues that focusing on the demand to eliminate veritic luck from knowl-
edge may actually pave the way for a solution to the generality problem. No such solution is 
attempted here.
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reality—the significance condition will always be fulfilled if  the event in 
question is the formation of a true belief. Whittington then argues that 
any amount of veritic luck is sufficient to prevent knowledge. On this view, 
Ballantyne’s case where we have a vertically lucky belief  that does not con-
stitute knowledge because its truth is not important enough to the agent 
concerned is impossible. The formation of a true belief  always has enough 
epistemic significance to prevent the belief  from constituting knowledge if 
it has the “right” modal profile. No true belief  fails the epistemic signifi-
cance test, and so increasing or decreasing significance in the veritic luck 
case will never reverse the verdict on whether the relevant belief  consti-
tutes knowledge or not.
Of course, the formation of some true beliefs may have more signifi-
cance than the formation of others. Some beliefs are located at the cen-
tre of our “web of beliefs,” others more on the outskirts. Forming some 
beliefs will have wide-ranging implications for other beliefs that we hold, 
and our contact with reality in general, whereas the formation of some 
others may not. But the point here is that even small epistemic significance 
is enough to prevent knowledge, given the right modal profile. Consider 
the following illustration. I am at a McDonald’s restaurant and, looking at 
the ball pit, guess that there are 3,409 balls in it. As a matter of fact, I am 
right. In this case, the formation of this true belief  has virtually no practi-
cal consequences for me, and so it’s overall significance may be negligible. 
Nevertheless, the current proposal is that from the epistemic point of view, 
the event is significant enough to have the event be subject to substantial 
veritic luck. This would explain why we would clearly deny knowledge in 
this case. Relating veritic luck not to significance in general but rather to 
epistemic significance specifically may thus enable us to evade the objec-
tion that including a significance condition on luck will lead to unaccept-
able forms of pragmatic encroachment in the theory of knowledge. So it 
is at the very least doubtful that the modal account of luck leads to the 
pragmatic encroachment Ballantyne laments, and even if  does, it is not 
clear that this would be a bad thing.
A second consequence of our theory of luck for epistemology is that 
conceiving of luck as a graded phenomenon supports a particular pic-
ture of the relation between luck, knowledge, and justification. As I said 
earlier, some epistemologists claim that knowledge admits of no degree 
of veritic luck. But it should be clear that beliefs that are subject to only 
small degrees of veritic luck may still be justified. Take the case of believ-
ing that your lottery ticket will lose purely based on the odds involved. 
Your belief  may very well turn out to be true. Even if  it is, your belief 
will not constitute knowledge, since there is a close possible world where 
the same method of belief  formation will lead you to form a false belief. 
Nevertheless, due to the fact that, as we have seen, degree of luck decreases 
when the proportion of nearby worlds where your method produces a 
false belief  drops, the degree of veritic luck to which your belief  is subject 
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will be relatively small. The fact that in this case most of us would not 
ascribe knowledge but would ascribe justification provides support for the 
claim that justification is compatible with small degrees of veritic luck, 
even if  knowledge is not. This also seems to be in accord with the usual 
understanding of Gettier cases, in which justification and veritic luck are 
present at the same time.
This does not, however, mean that justification is compatible with all 
degrees of veritic luck. Our McDonald’s ball pit example suffices to show 
this. There the degree of veritic luck present is enough to prohibit both 
knowledge and justification. A plausible next question is then what the 
threshold value of veritic luck is for justification. Plausible as this question 
may seem, I think it is nevertheless wrongheaded. For it seems clear that 
justification itself  is a graded notion. Just as one can be more or less verit-
ically lucky, one can be more or less justified.
Given that justification is a graded notion, it seems plausible that the 
degree of justification increases when the veritic luck to which the belief 
is subject decreases. To take our earlier examples, one is more justified in 
believing that one will lose the lottery when this belief  is subject to a rela-
tively small degree of veritic luck than one is in believing the exact number 
of balls in the McDonald’s ball pit is 3,409 when this belief  is subject to 
a relatively large degree of veritic luck. Justification and veritic luck seem 
to move in opposite directions. On the basis of this, I submit the following 
theses concerning the relation between luck, knowledge, and justification.
1. The higher the degree of veritic luck, the lower the degree of 
justification, and vice versa.
2. Knowledge requires the absence of any degree of veritic luck.
Taken together, these theses imply a third one, namely, that knowl-
edge requires a maximal degree of justification if the degree of justifi-
cation is measured in terms of the degree of veritic luck to which one’s 
belief is subject. Of course, the above does not provide a full argument 
for these claims, but I do think these claims are made plausible by the 
account of luck that emerges from this paper and some of the intuitive 
judgements concerning the presence or absence of knowledge and justi-
fication that we have reviewed. In any case, it provides another illustra-
tion of how one’s account of luck might have important implications for 
one’s epistemology.
6. Conclusions
The aim of this paper has been twofold. First, I explained and evaluated 
various respects in which Pritchard’s modal account of luck has changed 
over the years. Concerning this point I argued that, perhaps surpris-
ingly, the earlier Pritchard (2005) provides a better account of luck than 
© 2019 The Authors Metaphilosophy published by Metaphilosophy LLC and John 
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the later one (2014). If one chooses to adopt a modal account of luck, 
Pritchard 2005 should be the place to start.
Second, I discussed two implications of the account of luck that emerged 
from the first part of the paper. The first of these concerns the extent to 
which the account of luck defended in the paper leads to an objectionable 
pragmatic encroachment in the theory of knowledge. I argued, first, that 
even if  the account would lead to pragmatic encroachment, it is not clear 
that this pragmatic encroachment would be objectionable, and that it is 
unclear whether the account leads to pragmatic encroachment in the first 
place. I argued, secondly, that the account of luck defended in this paper is 
congenial to a particular picture of the relation between luck, justification, 
and knowledge, where knowledge is seen to require a maximal degree of 
justification.
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